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INTRODUCTION
In the current environment in both Afghanistan and Iraq, ethical dilemmas involving the law of land warfare face soldiers and leaders every day. And because of nearly instant communications and the proliferation of television cameras across the battle space, actions taken by individual soldiers can have strategic implications for our Army and nation. As the war against terror is fought on the asymmetric battlefield, these challenges will continue. In fact, with an increasing world population and the continued urbanization of the planet, the sterile battlefield with clearly delineated forces on both sides, may become a relic of the past. A complex battlefield is the present and the future and the key to successfully navigating this ethically challenging environment is training.
Well trained soldiers at all levels, from the private manning the machine gun to the general approving targeting plans, must understand the law of land warfare and the rules of engagement. They must train as they will fight. They must act decisively in the heat of battle knowing that their training has prepared them to react properly. To achieve that level of proficiency, commanders have access to a number of training simulations. "Live, virtual, and constructive training opportunities are integral components of a commander's training strategy to develop competent, confident, and adaptive leaders, battle staffs, and units." 1 The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of current Army doctrine on the Law of Land Warfare(LLW) and Rules of Engagement(ROE), discuss the simulation training tools that are available to train according to that doctrine, and make recommendations for changes to doctrine and the training simulation tools.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The LLW and ROE are not new topics for the US military. However, they take on added influence when operating in the complex environment of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTWA) as the US military has done extensively over the past decade. Because of the ambiguity found in these environments and the limited mandates for action in many of them, the ROE may significantly constrain the action of US forces. If soldiers are not properly trained on the application of ROE, the ROE may have devastating consequences for deployed forces.
A brief examination of two historical examples highlights divergent outcomes that occurred as a result of poorly understood ROE. The first example is the US Army's experience in Vietnam. Although an often quoted objective during the war was to win the hearts and minds of the people, American actions on the ground often had the opposite effect. Because most soldiers did not understand the ROE or the basis for the ROE, many tended to ignore them or find a "creative application" of the ROE that often wound up in the death of civilians. 3 The creation of "free fire zones" under the ROE became a justification for targeting civilians, actions that are illegal under international law.
The failure of Marine sentries to prevent a suicide bomber from driving into the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983 is a second example of poorly understood and trained ROE. In that case, two Marine sentries standing guard over the marine compound failed to engage a civilian truck that crashed through a concertina barrier, through a rear gate and sandbag barrier and into the ground floor of the barracks before blowing up and killing 241 marines and sailors. Neither sentry had a magazine loaded in his weapon despite the fact that they both possessed ROE cards instructing them to have a magazine in their weapon. The sentry providing security and surveillance of the parking lot witnessed the suspicious behavior of the truck, as it circled the parking lot twice before crashing through the barrier. Even though personally threatened, he never loaded a magazine in his weapon. The second sentry recognized the threat, loaded a magazine into his rifle, chambered a round, but never fired.
This failure to act was the result of poor understanding of the ROE and the lack of training in the application of that ROE. As both examples illustrate, ROE that are not understood and trained can have a disastrous effect on the execution of a mission. 
DOCTRINAL REVIEW
The foundation for all army training on the law of land warfare resides in FM 27-10, The The chapter further states that "ROE should always include situational training. This situational training should challenge soldiers in employing weapons, levels of force, and other ROE. Situational training exercises (STXs) focus on one or a small group of tasks-within a particular mission scenario-and require that soldiers practice until the tasks can be executed to some pre-established standard." 10 This concept of identifying tasks, the conditions under which the task must be accomplished and the standard by which the task will be judged, mirrors that found in FM 7-0, Training the Force.
One recommended training device is the mnemonic RAMP shown in the figure below.
FIGURE 1
"Because R-A-M-P principles incorporate necessity and proportionality, RAMP training provides a solid framework upon which mission-specific ROE training can build."
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The FM 27 series discussed above provides outstanding guidance for JAG officers.
However, for doctrine to be effective, the principles discussed in that series must be known and understood by the fighting force. FM-1, The Army, states that "Agile forces will be required to transition from stability operations and support operations to warfighting and back." 12 For that to happen, the principles of LLW and ROE must be present throughout all levels of Army doctrine to ensure understanding throughout the force. environments into which U.S. forces may be committed. By changing the nature of the threat from a monolithic, Soviet style, state based enemy to a much more diverse model, training units are forced to contend with a more complex battlefield. This new operating environment significantly raises soldier awareness of the ROE to deal with this ever changing enemy.
The foundational combined arms doctrine found in the FM 3-X series of field manuals provides extensive guidance on the incorporation of the principles of LLW and the development of ROE. One of the most significant fundamental differences from earlier doctrine, found in this series, is in the area of mission analysis. Most Army doctrine dated prior to 1999 states that mission analysis is METT-T driven. That is the analysis of the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and available time (friendly and enemy). In this FM 3 series and all new doctrine, a new letter "C" is added for civil considerations (METT-TC Commander, specifically addresses the role of the SJA for providing advice on the application of ROE during planning and execution and on the legal ramifications of fires against specific targets. 17 By doctrine, the SJA now provides input during both the planning and execution of fires. As an example, the SJA may advise a commander that it is permissible to shoot counterbattery fires at an enemy artillery position despite the fact that it is located in a heavily populated area or culturally sensitive site. He may also advise that only tube artillery, firing high explosive rounds, be used to avoid the collateral damage that would be caused by rocket fires. 
TRAINING SIMULATIONS
Why focus on simulation for training LLW and ROE? FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training,
states that "Commanders' training strategies use a mix of live, virtual, and constructive (L-V-C)
training to achieve and sustain unit and staff proficiency." 19 It also states that "Battalion commanders leverage V-C training events to accelerate junior leader mastery of tasks directly related to tactical competence, confidence, and proficiency." 20 Clearly, training doctrine dictates the use of simulation to achieve proficiency in this key area. "Live, virtual, and constructive training opportunities are integral components of a commander's training strategy to develop competent, confident, and adaptive leaders, battle staffs, and units." Because of the vast array of forces involved, a constructive simulation, Corps Battle Simulation (CBS), usually serves as the backbone simulation for BCTP "Warfighter" exercises. While CBS is a highly aggregated, low fidelity model, it serves as the driver for large exercises. "White Cells" composed of subject matter experts fill in the details in areas where the simulation is lacking them.
The areas most frequently associated with ROE/LLW issues during "Warfighter" exercises are targeting and fires. 25 The simulation portrays populated areas, POWs, refugees, etc. but not in a detailed manner. The "white cells" flesh out the situation for the player units and can add complexity to a situation. For instance, the simulation does not have the terrain resolution to show individual protected sites such as a church or hospital. Nor does it model individual entities such as a single artillery piece or individual people on the battlefield. However, the white cell can provide feedback to the player unit that artillery fires that they acquired on counter-battery radar emanated from a hospital parking lot filled with non-combatants. The simulation feedback coupled with the white cell input stimulates the targeting cells to consider munitions selection, clearance of fires, observation of fires, and awareness of non-combatants on the battlefield.
As preparation for a Corps "Warfighter" exercise in 2002, the III Corps conducted a Fire Support Seminar to address the issue of targeting a "COE OPFOR in populated areas while ensuring friendly fires are prompt, responsive, effective and don't violate the ROE." 26 Knowing that they would be faced with this conflict during the simulation, the Corps commander wanted to ensure that he had a deliberate decision making process in place and that process was documented through the use of a targeting record for each fire mission. 27 The result was a targeting record that listed the military necessity, collateral damage, mitigation of civilian casualties and proportionality assessment.
During the course of the Warfighter Exercise, using CBS as the simulation driver, the Corps was constantly faced with challenging decisions involving the use of fires. These included the presence of enemy artillery and ammunition supplies in civilian buildings, enemy direct fire anti-tank systems placed in school houses and enemy missile systems in civilian areas but outside the range of direct or indirect weapons systems. 28 In each case, the Corps was forced to evaluate the military nature of the target, the necessity of hitting the target and to make a proportionality assessment when deciding on how to engage each target. 29 Collateral damage concerns were present in all cases. This use of simulation challenged the unit to develop Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) which they will employ during their deployment to Iraq.
The most commonly used training simulations available to commanders from the company through brigade level are the Brigade/Battalion Simulation (BBS), Janus and Joint
Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS). Each of these simulations, to varying degrees, allows the integration of non-combatants onto the battlefield. These constructive simulations are entity based models, i.e., individual people and equipment are portrayed within the simulations. As is the case with CBS, Janus and JCATS are excellent tools for training ROE for the use of indirect fires. The availability in each of high resolution terrain, the ability to create discernable noncombatants and combatants in close proximity and the ability to select specific weapons and munitions creates a high resolution tool. These simulations provide the capability to deal with issues such as enemy positioning in normally protected sites, co-locating of enemy forces in civilian population centers, and counter-battery fires against unobserved targets. The simulation will provide feedback on "collateral damage" from the use of indirect fire systems.
A shortcoming of these simulations is in the area of direct fires. In both JCATS and Janus, an intent or status must be assigned to each force. The relationship between sides must be defined. If civilians are listed as neutral or friendly, they will not be engaged by friendly forces.
So, in the case of a direct fire ambush, initiated from a building on a busy city street, the force attacked will return fire only against the attacker. Any civilian or "neutral" players can walk through the ambush site and not be engaged. Because the simulation does not kill the innocent bystanders, negative training may take place as soldiers learn that the appropriate response during an ambush is to return indiscriminate massed fires without consideration for the consequences suffered by the civilian population.
As they are currently designed, virtual simulations offer the greatest potential for training individual soldiers on the application of ROE. However, most if not all scenarios available for training on the major training systems do not include ROE/LLW scenarios. For individuals and squads, one of the most powerful training tools is the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) 2000.
The EST 2000 is a Windows-based simulation system that can be used for basic marksmanship training or for squad level collective training exercises. Soldiers fire one of the 11 weapons programmed into the system, an air compressor hidden behind the scenes provides them with a recoil that simulates that particular weapon while a studio sound system creates realistic firing sounds and explosions." 30 The EST 2000 also provides the capability to train military police "shoot-don't shoot" scenarios that include civilian hostages and bystanders. This capability is not incorporated into the infantry based training scenarios. Of all the simulation shortcomings, this is the easiest one to fix since it only involves updating of scenarios, not a major change to the underlying simulation code. 31 The Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) is a system of manned modules and workstations that allow units to train armor, cavalry, and mechanized infantry collective tasks at the platoon through battalion task force level. "These components operate in a common synthetic battlefield using computer generated forces, a fiber optic network and protocols, and a fully Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) interface to create a realistic virtual battlefield." 32 The CCTT includes Semi-Automated Forces (SAF) that create a wide variety of computer generated OPFOR and BLUFOR vehicles and units. While it provides an outstanding training environment for mechanized and armor soldiers and leaders, it does not adequately meet the training requirements for ROE and LLW. For instance, OPFOR SAF tactics are based on the armor and mechanized based opposing force model contained in FM 100-60. They have not been updated to the COE as described in FM 7-100. In addition it is designed as a two sided simulation with BLUFOR and OPFOR workstations. In this environment, it is difficult to deal with the ambiguities imposed by the presence of non-combatants of differing allegiances on the battlefield. As a result, CCTT does not provide the conditions for training ROE/LLW.
Needed improvements to the system are the addition of a "White Cell" workstation, with appropriate SAF. In addition, scenarios upgraded to reflect current MTPs involving civilians, guerillas, and POWs would substantially improve commander's abilities to train subordinate forces on ROE/LLW prior to entering a combat theater. Border incursions, hostile crowds in villages and terrorist attacks on base camps all tested the units understanding and application of ROE. Soldiers were faced with a complex battlefield, crowded with non-combatants and constantly changing. Like most training exercises, weaknesses in ROE training were exposed. Soldiers took under direct fire a "civilian" who had mistakenly crossed the border. In another instance soldiers failed to follow the established ROE and allowed a vehicle loaded with a bomb to drive into the soldiers living area. In each case, the soldiers and leaders involved received feedback through an After Action Review (AAR) and were able to retrain the tasks to standard. Virtual simulations offer the opportunity to provide extremely realistic training for individual and small units. However, little money has been spent to adapt these tools.
CONCLUSION
For example, at FT Hood, Texas, III Corps became aware of the lessons learned on convoy ambushes coming out of Iraq. To address this critical vulnerability, they developed a "convoy trainer" simulation that linked a constructive simulation, JCATS, with Virtual Reality Scene Generation (VRSG) software and the EST 2000. This tool allowed soldiers and leaders to practice convoy procedures and react to ambush. While providing valuable training, the convoy trainer is limited in its ability to incorporate ROE issues into the simulation because of the inability to portray realistic non-combatants in the EST 2000. A capability that is technically feasible but has not been funded.
The current slate of constructive simulations also offers an excellent mechanism for the incorporation of LLW/ROE issues during training. Multi-sided, entity based constructive
